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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JERRY LAWLEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
VALLEY FORD, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba Valley Jaguar 
DAVID G. BASTIAN, an 
individual, 
Defendant-Appellant 
CASB NO. 87 0490 CA 
Brief of the Appellant 
Valley Ford, Inc. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (as amended). 
Nature of the Proceedings 
This is an appeal from the default judgment entered by 
the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy 
Hanson, in the sum of $34,059.96 against the Appellant, 
Valley Ford, Inc. 
Statement of the Issues 
The sole issue on appeal is: 
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing 
to set aside the default of the defendant where: 
(1) Defendant's Motion to Set the Default Aside 
was brought within three months of the default; 
(2) The motion was suppotted by an Affidavit 
setting forth a defense to the complaint; and, 
(3) The defendant failed td) file an answer only 
because defendant's attorney was attempting to personally 
contact plaintiff's attorney to negotiate a settlement and 
mistakenly assumed that in light of his attempt to contact 
opposing counsel, opposing counsel wpuld, as a commonly 
extended professional courtesy, withhold entering 
defendant's default until further discission or notice. 
Determinative Statute 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Prbcedure, provides as 
follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court m&y in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons 
in an action has not beert personally 
served upon the defendant as required 
by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment• The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1) (2), (3)J or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion urjder this 
subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This Rule does 
not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or tlo set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action. 
Statement of the Ca^e 
Respondent, Jerry Lawley, filed suit in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake Clounty against Valley 
Ford, Inc., and David Bastian seeking to rescind a 
contract for the purchase of the vehicle purchased from 
Valley Ford, Inc., and for damages allegedly arising from 
the sale. Those facts relevant to the issue on appeal are 
as follows: 
1. Valley Ford, Inc., was servled with plaintiff's 
Summons and Complaint on June 30, 1986. (R. 10) 
2. Counsel for the plaintiff was aware that the 
allegations of plaintiff's Complaint were disputed by Valley 
Ford, Inc., and alerted his secretary, soon after service 
was effected upon Valley Ford, Inc., to expect a phone call 
from Valley Ford's agent. (R. 33) 
3. Mr. Bryce Wade, Valley Fond, Inc.,'s registered 
agent and attorney, tried on numerous pccasions after having 
been served with plaintiff's Summons and Complaint and prior 
to the entry of the default certificate, to contract Mr. 
Lloyd Eldredge, plaintiff's attorney^ for the purpose of 
discussing the case and exploring the possibility of 
settlement by leaving phone messages for Mr. Eldredge. No 
direct communication was made between Mr. Wade and Mr. 
Eldredge until the day of the entry of default although 
attempts were made by Mr. Eldredge to return the calls of 
Mr. Wade. (R.15) 
4. Mr. Wade and Mr. Eldredge spolke with each other on 
July 22, 1986, the day the default was entered, regarding 
the case. In answer to Mr. Wade's suggestion that the 
parties attempt to negotiate an amicable settlement, or, if 
that was not acceptable, Mr. Wade would file an answer to 
plaintiff's Complaint with the court, Mr. Eldredge replied 
that it was too late to file an answer. (R.15) 
5. The default of Valley Ford was entered on July 22, 
1986, the date of the conversation between Mr. Wade and Mr. 
Eldredge. (R.12) 
6. Mr. Wade and Mr. Eldredge discussed the possibility 
of settlement until October 20, 1986, at which time 
negotiations ceased and Valley Ford, I^ ic. , moved the court 
to set aside the default judgment and also submitted in 
support thereof its proposed Answer and Third Party 
Complaint. (R.13, 15-16, 17-21) 
7. Valley Ford's motion to slet aside the default 
certificate was denied, (R.37-39|). A hearing was 
subsequently held on the issue of damages and judgment was 
entered against Valley Ford, Inc., in the sum of $34,059.96. 
The plaintiff was also required to return the vehicle to 
Valley Ford, Inc. (R.81-82) 
Summary of the Argument 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to 
set aside the default of Valley Forii, Inc., because the 
expectation of Mr. Bryce Wade, counsel for Valley Ford, 
Inc., that Mr. Eldredge would extend to him the common 
professional courtesy of not entering the default of 
Valley Ford, Inc., without discussion pr notice, where Mr. 
Wade had placed a number of phone callls with Mr. Eldredge's 
office, was reasonable and constitutes mistake, inadvertence 
or excusable neglect entitling Appellant to relief under 
Rule 60(b). 
Argument 
THE DENIAL OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT WAS AN ABUSE OF {DISCRETION. 
The present case involves a question of the proper 
application of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
a common factual situation made uncommon only by the 
intransigence of plaintiff's counsel. This appeal asks 
this court to decide if defendant's counsel's expectation of 
the professional courtesy from plaintiff's counsel of 
communication or notice before entering defendant's default 
was reasonable under the circumstances and, if so, was the 
Trial Court's refusal to set aside the default in this case 
an abuse of discretion. Standards of common courtesy and 
professional conduct previously articulated by the Utah 
Supreme Court, necessarily expected from counsel to 
expediently and economically resolve litigation and the 
principles and policies underlying in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, require this court's reversal of the 
Trial Court's order denying defendant's motion to set aside 
its default. 
At 4 6 Am Jur 2nd, Judgment, Section 686, it is stated: 
A motion to vacate a default 
judgment, and particularly when timely 
filed, is to be treated to best 
serve the ends of justice and preserve 
to a litigant his day in court. It is 
said that courts must, in a proper 
case, upon such a motion, yield 
the procedural exactitudes to the more 
basic rules of fundamental fairness. 
On the other hand, relief from a 
default judgment on the basis of 
equitable principals is to be granted 
only when the occasion demands it, when 
the exercise of such just power is 
necessary to prevent injustice. In 
any determination of whether a 
default judgment should be set aside, 
the court is governed by equitable 
principals requiring that a defendant 
be given a fair opportunity to litigate 
a disputed obligation, and also 
requiring that a plaintiff, who has 
according to regular and legal 
proceedings, secured a judgment be 
protected against a violation of the 
rules which require the sanctity and 
security of a valid judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has often stated its agreement 
with the position stated in the authority immediately above 
and has consistently held that a trial court should relieve 
a party from default if any reasonable excuse is offered by 
the defaulting party. In the case Of Olsen v. Cummings, 
565 P2d 1123 (Utah, 1977), the Utah Slupreme Court repeated 
its position as to vacation of default judgments: 
Although a trial couirt is endowed 
with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying 
a motion to vacate a final judgment, 
it cannot act arbitrarily. 
. . . it is quite uniformly regarded as 
an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there 
is reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to appear, 
and timely application is made to set it 
aside. 
Because an application to set aside a 
default is equitable in nature and is 
addressed to the conscience of the 
court, all the attendant (circumstances 
should be considered. Relief in doubtful 
cases considered. Relief in doubtful 
cases generally will be granted so a party 
may have a hearing. Id at 11B4. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the extreme 
hardship that a default can involve and has stressed the 
liberality with which Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, should be applied in such cases. The Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Utah Sand and Gravel Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Ut. 2d 407, 402 P2d 703 (Utah, 1965) stated: 
It is in accordance witth our rules, 
and our decisional law, that where a 
defualt has been taken ^gainst a party 
and there is any justifiable excuse, 
the court should be indulgent in 
setting aside the judgment to afford 
him an opportunity for a trial on 
merits, and any doubt about such a matter 
should be resolved in favor of doing 
so. 16 Utah 2nd at 410, 402 R2d at 704. 
It is clear that the policy of the Utah Supreme Court 
is in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court 
to settle the merits of the controversy. It is in favor of 
setting aside the judgment where a reasonable justification 
or excuse for the default appears. Nonetheless, the Utah 
Supreme Court allows trial courts "dilscretion" in deciding 
whether or not "reasonable justification or excuse" exists 
to justify setting aside the default judgment. This 
"discretion11 is not without bounds however. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Carman v. Slavfens 546 P2d 601 (Ut., 
1976): 
It is true that where thei authority to 
perform proposed action or rests within the 
discretion of the court we must allow 
considerable latitude in which he may 
exercise his judgment. But this does not 
mean that the court has unrestrained 
power to act in any arbitrary manner. 
Fundamental to the concept of the rule of 
law is the principal that reason and 
justice shall prevail over the arbitrary 
and uncontrolled will of any one person; 
and that this applies to all men in every 
status: to court's and judges as well 
as to autocrats or bureaucrats. The 
meaning of the term "discretion" itself 
imports that the action should be taken 
within reason and good conscience in the 
interest of protecting the rights of 
both parties and serving the ends of justice* 
It has always been the policy of our law 
to resolve doubts in favor of 
permitting parties to have their day 
in court on the merits of a controversy. 
Id at 603. 
The limits of the trial court's discretion to set aside 
default judgment in cases similar to the instant case have 
been recently set forth in the cases Helbresen v. Inyangumia, 
636 P2d 1079 (Ut. , 1981) and Katz v. ,Pierce 732 P2d 92 
(Ut., 1986). Helqesen v. inqvanauMa required the Utah 
Supreme Court to decide whether o r n o t the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing t o s e t aside a default 
judgment in a personal injury lawsuit. The trial court 
refused to set aside the default judgment even though the 
plaintiff's attorney and the defendant's insurance adjuster 
l>ad been in frequent contract V i t n each other for five 
months in negotiating a
 settleinei,lt o f the claims. 
Additionally, plaintiff's attorney was well aware that the 
claims at issue were in dispute and fullly expected a defense 
to the lawsuit. Nonetheless, shortly after the expiration 
of the twenty days for answering had expired, the 
plaintiff's attorney had the default of the defendant 
entered without giving prior notice to the adjuster. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court holding that the 
trial court abused its discretion i n failing to set aside 
the default. The court stated: 
Common courtesy and ordinary 
professional conduct dictated 
that before proceeding to the court 
the attorney should haVe made contact 
with the adjuster w i th whom he 
had been dealing with s o l<pg to have 
had not been filed. 14 at 1081. 
ijhe court went on to say: 
It is not uncommon in the practice of 
the law that when parties are 
negotiating settlement and one party 
files a lawsuit to bring pressure to 
bear, the other party is not strictly 
held to the time requirements of the 
rules of procedures gince settlement 
talk continues to the day of trial 
and a few days delay has little or no 
effect when the trial date will be set. 
Id at 1081. 
In Katz v. Pierce, the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
set aside a default judgment wher^ the plaintiff and 
defendant were negotiating a settlement after service of the 
complaint but prior to entry of default judgment. 
Plaintiff's counsel, by telephone call|, prior to submitting 
the default of the defendant to thfe court, advised the 
defendant's attorney that the plaintiff's claim would be 
actively pursued and that he expected an answer prior to the 
expiration of the time in which the answer had to be filed. 
Plaintiff's counsel followed that telephone call up with a 
letter of confirmation specifically cautioning defendant's 
attorney to file an answer within th£ time limit or his 
default would be entered. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
the refusal of the trial court to s^ t aside the default 
judgment under those circumstances was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court Court in featz v. Pierce found 
that an abuse of discretion on the partt of the trial court 
was not shown by the defendant where it was clear that 
the defendant ". . . was clearly advised that plaintiff 
expected a timely response to the complaint and that, 
otherwise, appellants default and a judgment would be 
immediately obtained." Id at 94. This is in contrast to 
the case in Helgesen where no such notification was given 
even though plaintiff's attorney kn$w the matter was 
disputed and negotiations were ongoing. 
The present case is closer factually to the facts in 
Helgesen which required setting aside the default than the 
facts of Katz, wherein an opposite result was obtained. 
Although all of the factual elements present in Katz 
justifying reversal of the trial courtj: in that case are not 
present in this case, the policy of liberality in setting 
aside default judgments and hearing cases on the merits 
warrants a similar holding as that obtained in Helegesen. 
In the present case, Mr. Eldredge, attorney for the 
plaintiff, knew of the dispute and full|y expected a defense. 
The Affidavit of Mr. Wade clearly stated that phone calls 
were passed between his office and M|r. Eldredge's office 
thereby indicating that Mr. Eldredge krtew that Mr. Wade was 
attempting to deal with the Complaint. Nonetheless, without 
so much as a letter or actual communication, Mr. Eldredge, 
shortly after the expiration of the twenty-day period, 
entered the default of Valley Ford, inc., stating to Mr. 
Wade on the very day the default was entered that "it was 
too late to file an answer." (R.15) 
Certainly a different case would e^ cist if Mr. Eldredge 
was not aware that this matter was vigorously disputed and 
was unaware that Mr. Wade was attempting to contact him, 
that is, if Mr. Wade did nothing. Howeyer, Mr. Eldredge did 
know that the action was disputed and did know that Mr. Wade 
was attempting to reach him. Certainly, the professional 
courtesy concept referred to in Helgesfen should extend to 
this situation and Mr. Eldredge should t^ ave at least sent a 
letter to Mr. Wade indicating that he J intended to stand by 
the twenty day period of the Summons and did not intend to 
communicate with Mr. Wade further ^  if such was his 
intention. 
An attorney should be able to rely upon the assumption 
that placing phone calls with opposing counsel puts opposing 
counsel who has served a complaint, where that attorney 
which counsel should 
knows that a dispute regarding the complaint exists, on 
notice that communication should |be made prior to 
precipitous action in a pending lawsuit. To hold otherwise 
would be to move one step back frjom the standard of 
cordiality and professional courtesy 
be able to expect from one another. Accordingly, this court 
should rule on the side of deciding cases on their merits 
and on the side of high standards of professional courtesy 
and cordiality, not on the side of procedural exactitudes. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appfellant, Valley Ford, 
Inc., respectfully requests that thijs Court vacate the 
judgment by default and remand this cajse with instructions 
to the District Court to set the case fbr trial. T 
DATED this <Q0 day of January, 198 
^h 
F-
Elggren & Van Dyke 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order. 
2. Affidavit of Bryce Wade. 
3. Answer and Third Party Complaint. 
4. Affidavit of Claudette Mathie. 
Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from over-
sight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, 
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed 
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Dis-
covered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the sum-
mons in an action has not been personally served upon the de-
fendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed 
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as pre-
scribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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attorney for Valley Ford 
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D I P 1 1 V L f l i K 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY LAWLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VALLEY FORD, INC 
corporation, dba 
JAGUAR, DAVID C. 
individual, 
Defendants. 
. , a Utah j 
VALLEY ) 
BASTIAN, an ) 
A F F I D A V I T 
Civil No. C 86-04943 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Bryce Wade, being first duly sworn, deposes ana says under 
oath: 
1. Affiant is the registered agent for VafLley Ford, Inc., 
and is authorized to make this Affidavit on behalf of Valley 
Ford, Inc., and on behalf of David C. Bastian, an employee of 
Valley Ford, Inc. Affiant is also an attorney and a member of 
the Bar of the State of Utah. 
2. On June 30, 1986, I was served witJft a Summons and 
Complaint in the above-entitled civil action. On approximately 
the same date, David c. Bastian, an employee of Valley Ford, 
Inc#, was also served with the Summons and Clomplaint in the 
above-entitled civil action. Said matter was brought to my 
£ttention for the purpose of filing an Answer in behalf of both 
defendants or to attempt to resolve the matter through 
settlement, 
3. During the twenty days following being served with the 
papers as set forth above, I tried on numerous occasions to 
contact Lloyd C. Eldredge, attorney for plaintiff. Some of my 
calls were not returned, and other calls were returned to me, but 
I was not available for calls at the time they were returned from 
plaintiff's attorney. On other occasions, no one answered the 
plaintiff's attorney's telephone number when I placed calls, and 
therefore, until approximately July 22, I was unable to make 
contact with plaintiff's counsel. 
4. The purpose of my call to plaintiff's counsel was for the 
purpose of attempting to propose a settlement for this matter or 
to obtain additional time for having an answer filed on behalf of 
the defendants. 
5. When I did speak with Mr. Eldredge, I was informed that a 
default had already been entered on both defendants and it was 
too late to file an answer. 
6. I then contacted Stephen B. Elggren to have him file an 
answer in behalf of Valley Ford and David C. Bastian and to make 
a Motion to Set Aside the Default that had been entered. 
However, in the process of my conversations with Mr. Elggren, I 
was able to make additional contact with Mr. Eldredge and we 
continued to make proposals for resolving this matter. 
7. Ultimately, on October 20, 1986, settlement negotiations 
broke down and it became necessary to take action under the 
d e f a u l t t h a t had been e n t e r e d . 
8. The i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t has been p r o v i d e d t o me i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t t h e r e a r e v a l i d d e f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , t he v e h i c l e s o l d t o t he p l a i n t i f f was s o l d "as i s " 
wi thout any warranty from the d e a l e r . Furthermore, t he r e were no 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made by the defendants to the p l a i n t i f f , and 
a l s o , i f any damages were caused to the v e h i c l e purchased by the 
p l a i n t i f f from defendant V a l l e y Ford, those damages r e s u l t e d from 
t h e r e p a i r s made by Less Jenson C o l l i s i o n Repa i r p r i o r t o t h e 
v e h i c l e b e i n g d e l i v e r e d to d e f e n d a n t V a l l e y Fo rd , I n c . , in 
connect ion w i t h a t r a d e - i n i n v o l v i n g s a i d v e h i c l e . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , inasmuch as t h e v e h i c l e was in t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s 
p o s s e s s i o n for a p e r i o d of t ime p r i o r t o any c l a i m for damages a s 
a s s e r t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f , such damages may have r e s u l t e d from 
t h e h a n d l i n g by p l a i n t i f f which was beyond t h e c o n t r o l of 
de fendan t s . 
9. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e d e f e n d a n t s c l a i m t h a t t h e y have v a l i d 
d e f e n s e s t o t h e c h a r g e s a s s e r t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f , a l s o t h e 
immedia te e n t r y of t h e D e f a u l t by t h e p l a i n t i f f a t t h e end of 
t w e n t y d a y s when a f f i a n t had been a t t e m p t i n g t o c o n t a c t 
p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel in an a t tempt to r e s o l v e t h i s mat ter p rov ides 
the b a s i s upon which a f f i a n t a s s e r t s t h a t the d e f a u l t should be 
s e t a s ide a g a i n s t defendants . ^ , 
" . ^ 
Btyce ,Wade 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .-' ^ day of October, 
1986. 
My commission expires: ^ --^.X-^ Notary Public Residing at:^U.uf 
0. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
Stephen B. Elggren 0970 
Attorney for Valley Ford 
444 South State St. #201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 531-7116 
No: 6-995 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY LAWLEY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
VALLEY FORDr 
corporation. 
JAGUAR, DAVID 
individual, 
r 
INC 
dba 
C. 
Defendants. 
VALLEY FORD, 
corporation, 
JAGUAR, DAVID 
individual, 
Third Par 
vs. 
INC 
dba 
C. 
ty 
. , a Utah 
VALLEY 
BASTIAN, 
., a Utah 
VALLEY 
BASTIAN, 
Plaintiffs 
an ) 
an ) 
>F ) 
LFSS JENSON COLLISION REPAIR, ) 
INC., a Utah 
Third Par 
cor 
ty 
poration, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER AND THIRD PARTY 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i l No. C 8 6 - 0 4 9 4 3 
D e f e n d a n t s V a l l e y F o r d , I n c . , a n d D a v i d C. B a s t i a n , 
h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o d e f e n d a n t s , t h r o u g h t h e i r u n d e r s i g n e d 
c o u n s e l , a n s w e r t h e C o m p l a i n t a s f o l l o w s : 
FIRST DEFENSE 
P l a i n t i f f ' s C o m p l a i n t f a i l s t o s t a t e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s upon w h i c h r e l i e f c a n b e g r a n t e d . 
SECOND DEFENSE 
D e f e n d a n t s a n s w e r t h e numbered p a r a g r a p h s of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
Compla in t a s f o l l o w s : 
1 . Admit t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of p a r a g r a p h Nos. 1 , 3 r 5 and 3 1 . 
2. D e f e n d a n t s a r e w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n t o admi t or 
d e n y w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t D a v i d C. B a s t i a n was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e 
s c o p e of h i s a g e n c y f o r d e f e n d a n t V a l l e y F o r d , I n c . , and t h e r e -
f o r e d e n y t h a t p o r t i o n of p a r a g r a p h No. 2 of t h e C o m p l a i n t b u t 
admi t a l l o t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s in s a i d p a r a g r a p h . 
3 . Deny t h a t a n y m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w e r e made t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f and t h e r e f o r e deny t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of p a r a g r a p h Nos. 6, 
7 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 
2 7 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 2 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 5 , 3 6 , and 37 of p l a i n t i f f ' s C o m p l a i n t 
and a l l o t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s n o t a d m i t t e d h e r e i n . 
4 . As t o p a r a g r a p h N o s . 4 , 8 , 1 6 , 2 1 , a n d 30 of t h e 
C o m p l a i n t , d e f e n d a n t s i n c o r p o r a t e h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e t h ^ 
a p p l i c a b l e answer s a s s e t f o r t h a b o v e . 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. As a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s , d e f e n d a n t s a s s e r t t h a t t h e 
v e h i c l e s o l d t o p l a i n t i f f was s o l d w i t h o u t d e a l e r w a r r a n t y , i . e . , 
"AS I S " , p u r s u a n t t o t h e t e r m s of t h e A u t o m o b i l e A g r e e m e n t , a 
copy of which i s annexed h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t "A". 
2. D e f e n d a n t s f u r t h e r a s s e r t a s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e t h a t 
no m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w e r e made by t h e d e f e n d a n t s t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f . 
3 . The v e h i c l e was i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r 
some p e r i o d of t ime b e f o r e any c l a i m s were made by t h e p l a i n t i f f 
a s t o any p r o b l e m s in c o n n e c t i o n w i th t h e v e h i c l e , p l a i n t i f f had 
driven the vehicle on various occasions before purchase and there 
were no known problems with said vehicle which was accepted by 
the plaintifff and any damage to the vehicle may have been caused 
by the plaintiff subsequent to his receiving possession of the 
same • 
4. Any repairs made to the vehicle which have been made 
negligently were made by Less Jenson Collision Repair which was 
not an agent of the defendant and if there was any impropei 
repair, Less Jenson Collision Repair would be liable to the 
plaintiff and should indemnify the defendants for any damages 
suffered herein. 
5. The action brought by the plaintiff has been brought in 
bad faith and defendant should be awarded attorney's fees for 
appearing herein pursuant to 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice and that defendants be awarded 
attorney's fees for appearing herein. 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Defendant Valley Ford, Inc., asserts a Third Party Complaint 
and complains of Less Jenson Collision Repair as follows: 
1. As a condition for third party plaintiffs to accept a 
trade-in of a 1984 Jaguar XJS, VIN #SAJNV5843EC113007 from Kent 
Jones, said vehicle was to be properly repaired by third party 
defendant Less Jenson Collision Repair, Inc. 
2. Said vehicle was improperly repaired and any damages that 
the plaintiff has suffered were the result of improper repairs 
and/or services performed by Less Jenson pursuant to an agreement 
with the prior owner of said vehicle, Kent Jones, 
3. Said vehicle was traded into the defendant Valley Ford, 
Inc., on the condition that proper repairs were made on said 
vehicle, and if repairs made on said vehicle are not proper, 
and/or defendants are damaged as a result of the claims of 
plaintiff against defendants, defendants are entitled to judgment 
against third party defendant, Less Jenson Collision Repair, for 
said sum together with costs for appearing herein. 
4. Damages suffered by the defendants at the hands of third 
party defendant are unknown at this time and will be determined 
at trial. 
WHEREFORE, third party plaintiffs pray that judgment be 
rendered against third party defendant requiring third party 
defendant to indemnify third party plaintiffs for any damages 
suffered by third party plaintiffs in the above-entitled civil 
action. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 1986. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
Stephen B. Elgg^en 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I duly mailed, postage prepaid, at Salt 
Lake City, Utah on the 22nd day of October, 1986, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the following: Lloyd C. 
Eldredge, Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O. Box 17884, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84117. 4L^^^^//y 
Stephen B,/ Elggren/ 
SBE/nh 
JEKALD A LAULEY 
VERTON State OH Zip Code 97006 
U3REE TO PURCHASE FROM YOU, UNDER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SPECIFIED, THf FOLLOWING: 
bneii&L 
NEW 
84 
YEAR 
84 
MAKE 
IAGUAR 
MODEL 
XJS 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBEI 
SAJNV5343EC1130U7 
COLOR 
GRAY 
TRIM 
i VEHICLE SOLD AS EQUIPPED UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED IN THIS AGREEMENT 7 NO FREE WORK PROMIRED 10 
11 
6 12 
lis purchase is to be made 19 -
>r the manufacturer will be liable for failure to effect delivery. 
or as soon thereafter as! possible. It is agreed, however, that neither 
sumes responsibility for any difference In 
i excess of amount shown below, and will 
i difference in cash on demand, if not so paid. 
orizes dealer, at dealer's option, to Increase the monthly 
jnd contract balance to cover the difference and finance 
ereon, or repossess the vehicle sold. 
this vehicle Is made by dealer subject to credit approval by 
nancial Institution where customer has agreed for dealer to 
incing. In the event of a credit report unacceptable to the 
the financial institution, the purchaser will return the 
rein described Immediately to the dealer and pay any costs 
n vehicle repair and recovery costs, mileage and loss of use 
, of which such costs or damages may have been created 
rm of buyers usage. In the event of customer obtaining own 
... or cash, money is due as shown in payment schedule. 
vehicle of I h«eta astume-personal responsibility for the balance owed on the above described 
*£S p"> v , d * d e a , e r w,,h ,ree and c,Mr 
litis to trade In II any, and pay any outstanding property taxes on or before _ _— • 
I understand that Valley Ford Inc. Is NOT responsible tor obtaining financing lor this vehicle nor have such 
representation been made to me. 
Signatui 
Selling Price Including 
Delivery & Handling 
j*^LeV d\ (y) a*<<*&*u*/ 
260Cr.nO 
Less Trade i\7/\ 
Net for Sales ?nPPn,ffi. 
Cash Price w/Accessories 
Delivery & Handling 
TOTAL CASH PRICE (1M 
?6oro. 
$ 189 
?r'>npp. 
2E TO BUYER: The seller, hereby expressly disclaims all warran-
t e r express or implied, including any implied warranty of 
tantability or fitness for a particular purpose, and neither assumes 
jthorizes any other person to assume for it any liability in connec-
wth the sale of the vehicle. 
Sales Tax UA. 
License & Fees n/A 
License & Title Service in.pp, 
Sof6iki(£)ntract V/f\ 10. nn 
CE TYPE IDENTIFICATION NO. TOTAL 1 & 2 
JMETER READING COLOR TRANS AIR COND. P. STEER- VINYL ROOF ?6om. 
3d Veh. Allowance [J/A Bal. Due (Payoff) M/A Net Equity f\7A 
lance Owed To: 
ish on Delivery N/A Cash Deposit with Order N/A 
AL DOWN PAYMENT 
BALANCE DUE 
J -
IABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
ODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE 
?>JUSEWO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED. 
Customer's Signature 
INSURANCE 
Collision Deductible 
Fire. Theft & Comprehensive 
Credit Life 
Accident and Health 
Payment Schedule: 
fp tc ia l Notes payments @ $ Due 
Balance in monthly notes of $ each starting 
lloon Ptymtnt(a) $ on. on.. 
TERM (MONTH) PREMIUM 
TOTAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS (3) 
(Insert amount of each payment that is more than twice the amount of any otherwise regularly scheduled 
equal payment.) 
UNPAID BALANCE, 
Including Insurance 
-EINANCEirHARQE SSL 
DEFERRED PAYMENT PRICE 
Sum of 1, 2, 3 and 4 
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 
CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE 
Credit life insurance and, or accident and health insurance is available 
only on the life of one natural person who is obligated to make pay-
ments under this retail installment instrument and who is under the age 
of 65 on the date hereof. Benefits will be limited to a refund of premiums 
if there is no person eligible for such insurance, or if death results from 
suicide within one year from date hereof or from certain pre-existing 
diseases or conditions within ninety days from the date hereof. 
Credit Life or Credit Accident & Health Insurance on the life of 
Credit Accident and, or Life Insurance provided by 
In accordance with the separate Application, Noticce 
Certificate or Policy delivered to fluyer This date. 
This agreement is not binding on dealer untii accepted by dealer in writing. I have read the printed matter on the back hereof and agree to it as a ps 
of this agreen ent, and the front and back of this agreement comprise the entire agreement pertaining to this purchase.! further agree that no pr 
mises or representations have been made to me other than what is stated in this agreement. In the event the vehicle sold hereunder is a used vehic 
it is ag reed that dealer assumes only such warranty obligations to Buyer as are set forth on the face of this order or in a separate written instrumen 
any. New car warranties are only those which are issued in writing directly from the manufacturer. 
NOTICE TO THE BUYER: 
Do not sign this contract before you read It or If It contains any blank 
spaces. You are entitled to an exact copy of the contract you sign. 
Buyer acknowledges receipt of a true and completely filled In copy of 
this contract at thetlme of signing. Buyer certifies that he/she Is at least 
18 years of age and no credit has been extended except as appears her-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY LAWLEY, 
vs . 
VALLEY FORD, INC. 
coorporation, dba 
DAVID C. BASTIAN, 
Plaintiff, ] 
a Utah ] 
VALLEY JAGUAR, ] 
individual , 
Defendants. 
1 A F F I D A V I T 
1 Civil N0.C86 04943 
1 Judge Timothy R. Hansen 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Claudette Mathie, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That she is receptionist and secretary to Lloyd C. 
Eldredge who is the attorney for the Plaintiff in the above 
ent i tled act ion . 
2. That she is primarily responsible for the receipt 
and logging and incoming telephone calls to the Law Office of 
Lloyd C. E l d r e d g e , that her normal working hours are 
approximately 8:30 a.m. to approximately 5:30 p.m. Monday through 
Friday and that at all times, including weekends, when she is not 
on duty and acting as receptionist there is an answering machine 
at said offices for the receipt of incoming calls. 
^ That on ~o>~ab'otn>' Junm 30, lt8€ 
Mr, Eldredge that the Summons and Complaint prepared 
indicated case against Defendant, Valley Ford, Inc., 
s e r v e d and I was a l e r t e d to expect a phone call from a 
representative from said Defendant. 
4. At no time during the hours for which I was in my 
usual place of employment and acting as receptionist in the Law 
Office of Lloyd C. Eldredge, was a phone call received by me from 
Mr, Bryce Wade or anyone else porporting to represent Valley 
Ford, Inc. 
5. I have reviewed the incoming phone memos which are 
maintained at our offices for the period of June 30, 1986 up to 
and including June 22, 1986 and, except as hereinafter set forth, 
can discover no call from Mr. Bryce Wade or any other person 
representing Valley Ford, Inc., or any other matter concerning 
the above indicated matter. 
6. That on July 22, 1986, a call was received from 
Mr. Bryce Wade and recorded by the answering machine at our 
offices. A copy of the phone memo concerning the said call, and 
prepared by me, dated July 22, is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", 
and by this reference incorporated herein. As previously stated 
this is the only call received by me or received on our answering 
machine from Mr.Bryce Wade or any other individual representing 
Valley Ford, Inc. 
2 
frcwi*;i-*&<n 
PUTHER AFFIANT SAYTU
 4,.\ 
DATED t h i s o)yOu day $ 
LAUDETTE MATHIE f 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s C ^ ^ r ^ day of 
frJ#ltejhLuV~ , 1986. 
N o t a i ^ Pi i t f l ic 
R e s i d i n g at 
My c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r e s 
r 
\ * 1 
